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Abstract 
The official National Accounts of Tanzania suffer from two serious weaknesses: 
incomplete coverage as well as inaccurate estimates of the activities covered. 
This arises because many of the activities, especially those in the informal sector, 
are either misreported or under-recorded. Often, however, the required information 
is deliberately concealed from public authorities either because the agents are 
involved in illegal (black market) activities or where such (parallel market) 
activities are legal, there is a deliberate intention to evade government controls. 
The misstatement and omission of these 'second economy' activities from official 
statistics imply that macroeconomic measures are not robust enough for 
meaningful analysis, development planning, policy and programme formulation. 
This paper attempts to examine the nature and magnitude of the second economy 
in Tanzania to establish the extent to which official series misstate actual production 
of goods and services. 
B Introduct ion 
One of the major problems of analyzing African economies is the absence of 
reliable, accurate and consistent official statistics (Yeats, 1990). In Tanzania, for 
example, although the official national accounts are carefully compiled broadly 
following the conventional guidelines of the UN System of National Accounts, 
the existing official series are still limited. The series suffer from two weaknesses: 
incomplete coverage as well as inaccurate estimates of the activities covered. 
In some cases omission of some activities from official national accounts is 
deliberate because of accounting conventions. In others, however, omissions from 
national accounts occur by chance or oversight. At times, misreporting or under-
reporting is caused by deficiencies in estimation methods (especially the failure 
to value correctly some of transactions that are recorded). Misreporting also occurs 
because of difficulties associated with data collection, particularly where activities 
are not easily accessible. Often, however, the required information is deliberately 
concealed or hidden from public authorities, either because the agents are involved 
in forbidden illegal activities or, where such activities are legal, there is a deliberate 
intention to avoid paying taxes, to evade price controls, or to avoid paying social 
security and medical insurance contributions. 
Since macroeconomic policies are influenced by estimates from the national 
accounts, the omission or undue reporting of certain economic activities could 
easily lead to faulty policy analysis. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth, savings, consumption, productivity 
and balance of payments estimates may be biased and could result in the wrong 
conclusions about the manipulation of monetary and fiscal policy instruments. 
Moreover, it is not possible to make sense of income distribution without taking 
account of, for example, informal sector incomes. With wage earners resorting to 
unrecorded food provisioning and trade, and farmers resorting to non-farm income, 
including remittances, it becomes misleading to take formal wages or prices in 
rural areas as even proxy indicators of welfare or income distribution (Jamal and 
Weeks, 1988). 
This paper examines the nature and estimates the magnitude of the second 
economy in Tanzania to establish the extent to which official national accounts 
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misstate actual or real production of goods and services. Section II sets up the 
conceptual framework and defines the concepts, and in Section III recent 
developments in the major components of the second economy are discussed. In 
Section IV, model specification and empirical results on the size of the second 
economy are presented and analysed, and the conclusion is presented in Section 
V. 
II Conceptua l f ramework 
The concept of a second economy is also variously known as the underground, 
parallel, unofficial, shadow, black, or irregular economy, has many definitions 
and interpretations.1 In is paper, the second economy is defined broadly to include 
all economic activities which should be included in national income but are 
presently not captured by official national accounts statistics.2 Such second 
economy activities usually fall outside government benefits and regulations. 
In conceptualizing the second economy, it is convenient to group the many 
and diverse perceptions of it into two main contrasting views. One view stresses 
its dysfunctional aspects and regards the second economy as clandestine; a sector 
that denies the state of its legitimate revenue needs, serves as a breeding ground 
for theft and fraud and is inequitable and exploitative (Wiles, 1987). According 
to this view, the second economy is irrational and represents undesirable departures 
from established economic and social norms or equilibrium. 
The other view regards second economy activities as productive and creative 
adaptations to social or market forces working towards socioeconomic harmony 
or equilibrium. Such behaviour is conceived to have developed in response to a 
consumer's basic needs and the failure of the formal official system to deliver in 
time the goods and services required; and/or as a revolt against excessive state 
intervention. According to this view, the second economy is not a pathological 
fact but a kind of nature's revolt, a sort of healthy reaction to the pathology of the 
state (Del Boca and Fortes, 1982). 
The dysfunctional approach to the study of the second economy - as an entirely 
illegal sector - fails to distinguish socially and economically productive activities 
that constitute a potential asset to the development of the economy from those 
that are unproduct ive and harmful . Such a view is based on a narrow 
conceptualization of the sector. It is consequently instructive to perceive the second 
economy in its broader context. With some degree of overlap, this allows one to 
classify second economy activities into three broad categories: informal sector, 
parallel, and black market activities. 
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Informal sector activities 
In this paper, 'informal sector' refers to small-scale units producing and distributing 
goods and services, consisting of both employed workers and self-employed 
persons in rural and urban areas. They are informal in the sense that they are for 
the most part unregistered; unrecorded in official statistics; have little or no access 
to organized markets, to credit institutions, to formal education and training or to 
many public services. As they are often not recognized or supported by government 
they are compelled by circumstances to operate outside the framework of the 
law. 
Informal sector activities are socially and economically worthwhile productive 
activities and services normally initiated with the honest (legal) objective of 
producing a product or offering a service for sale or own use. These activities 
genuinely contribute to an increase in the total output of goods and services. 
Although in some cases the means used in performing these activities may not 
comply with legal requirements (for example, quality and health standards), the 
activities have highly desirable objectives such as building a house, manufacturing 
a product or providing a service. 
Parallel market activities 
Parallel market activities involve the illegal production and trade of goods and 
services that are legal in themselves, and therefore have an alternative legal market. 
Such activities usually develop in response to excessive government intervention 
and restriction which creates excess demand or supply. For example, when a tax 
rate per article is high there is a tendency for tax evasion and if the risks for 
evading taxes are not prohibitive, supply and demand may clear at a price which 
is lower than the tax-paid price. Similarly, higher duties on imports create an 
incentive to under-report imports while subsidies may encourage exporters to 
over-invoice shipments. Price controls, import licensing and credit restrictions 
amidst shortages and inflation create excess demand which sets up a queue of 
people willing to buy goods and services at higher unofficial prices. Higher parallel 
market prices motivate producers and traders to divert part of their output to the 
unofficial market. 
Managed exchange rates and foreign exchange rationing often cause 
overvaluation, which creates excess demand for foreign currency and gives rise 
to parallel market transactions in convertible currencies. In addition, over-valued 
domestic currency creates an incentive to under-invoice exports if exporters have 
to surrender foreign exchange at the official (low) rate. Similarly, importers may 
be encouraged to over-invoice to obtain excess foreign currency and sell the bal-
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ance on the parallel market or bank it abroad and use it to finance own imports. 
Control over interest rates results in excess demand for credit at official rates 
giving rise to curb markets. Parallel labour markets may also develop where gov-
ernment imposes minimum wages and employee benefits. 
Whatever their form, the principal objective of parallel market activities is to 
amass illegitimate profit, i.e., reap scarcity rents by not following price directives, 
quota restrictions, ration coupons or confinement of sale of certain commodities 
to public monopolies. 
Black market activities 
These activities produce and/or distribute market and non-market goods that are 
illegal and strictly forbidden by government statutes. They include smuggling, 
over- and under-invoicing, unlicensed deals in arms, narcotics trafficking and all 
sorts of illegal transfers, for example, thefts and bribes. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that although the terms informal, parallel 
and black markets are often employed interchangeably, it is instructive to treat 
them as describing different phenomena. They also have different implications 
for policy. However, one thread that weaves its way through all the three sets of 
activities is their absence in official national accounts. 
Ill Recent deve lopments in the second 
e c o n o m y 
Developments in the informal sector 
In Tanzania, there has always been a considerable amount of household level 
economic activity which has fallen outside the system of official control. The 
efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s to measure subsistence activities in the 
national accounts reflected an effort to take account of some part of that activity 
in official statistics. However, in the early days of national accounting, subsistence 
activities were seen as predominantly rural, mainly traditional, economic activities 
which had not yet been drawn into the market economy, or those involving purely 
local transactions unrecorded in official surveys. 
As real wages fell dramatically and migration continued, the informal sector 
began to incorporate a diverse range of urban activities as urban areas grew in the 
1970s and 1980s. These urban activities have increased greatly in range and 
quantity in recent years. A survey carried out in 1990 revealed that in Dar-es-
Salaam, the country's largest city, the number of informal sector enterprises were 
estimated to be at least three times the level of the mid-1980s. Most of the 
enterprises surveyed had, moreover, more than doubled their employment levels 
between 1984 and 1990 (World Bank, 1991). A nationwide sample survey of 
Tanzania's Zanzibar Islands revealed that the informal sector there employed 
39% of the total estimated (320,030) labour force in 1990; while in mainland 
Tanzania, results of a country-wide survey showed that in 1991 the sector employed 
23% of the total estimated (10.3 million) labour force. 
The rapid growth of Tanzania's informal sector in the 1980s is consistent with 
the evidence for most of Sub-Saharan Africa3 and can be explained from three 
perspectives. First is the erosion and compression of formal wages and salaries. 
Real wages and salaries, especially of government and public sector employees, 
have fallen drastically over time. The real value of the average civil service wage 
in 1986 was less than 18% of its real value in 1975 and could cover only about 
one-quarter of the required expenses of a typical household (World Bank, 1991). 
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Table 1 gives further evidence of the erosion of real wages. In 1986 the real 
minimum wage and the real value of the average top bracket civil service wage 
were only 46% and 27.8% respectively of the real wages prevailing in 1980. 
These figures suggest that, on average, higher income earners, appear to have 
suffered more from falling purchasing power than low income earners, leading to 
a narrowing in occupational wage differentials. Compression in the wage struc-
ture is further reflected in the decline of the ratio of the average top bracket civil 
service real wage to the real minimum wage over time. 
Table 1 Trends in real wages and per capita income in Tanzania, 1980-90 
Year Real Top Ratio of Kg of Real Ratio of Ratio of 
urban bracket top bracket maize per capita real top bracket 
minimum civil real wage flour for income2 minimum civil service 
wage service to minimum a day's Tsh wage to average real 
(Tsh) average wage minimum (1976 real per wage to real 
real'wage wage in Dar prices) capita income per capita 
(1) (2) (3) = (2/1) (4) (5) (6) = (1/5) income 
(7) 
1980 291 5150 17.7 12.8 1250 0.23 4.12 
1981 279 4985 17.9 6.7 1133 0.25 4.40 
1982 228 3877 17.0 8.0 1255 0.18 3.09 
1983 185 2978 15.6 8.0 1167 0.16 2.55 
1984 212 1529 7.0 3.4 1171 0.18 1.31 
1985 145 1897 13.1 2.0 1172 0.12 1.62 
1986 134 1433 10.7 2.6 1181 0.11 1.21 
1987 137 1356 9.9 2.9 1186 0.12 1.14 
1988 127 1220 9.6 2.9 1203 0.11 1.01 
1989 123 1073 8.7 3.5 1223 0.10 0.88 
1990 113 966 8.5 2.2 1273 0.08 0.76 
Notes: 'Nominal figures deflated by the National Consumer Price Index (1977 = 100);2 Nominal figures deflated by the 
implicit GDP deflator (1976 = 100). 
Sources: Tanzania Economic Survey (various issues); Bureau of Statistics; Ministry of Labour and Youth Development. 
The figures in Table 1 understate the true fall in real wages as many goods 
were either unobtainable or were obtainable only at parallel market prices. A 
rather disturbing picture emerges when the decline of the real minimum wage is 
expressed in terms of the amount of maize flour (the country's leading staple) 
that could be purchased by a day's minimum wage (Table 1). While in 1980 one 
day's minimum wage could purchase 12.8 kg of maize flour, in 1987 it could 
earn only 2.9 kg. This implies a significant decline of 77% in the real purchasing 
power of the minimum wage between 1980 and 1987. Moreover, the fall in the 
average real wage was not only particularly severe but was also long-lasting. 
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The last two columns in Table 1 indicate that between 1980 and 1990 real 
wages have, on average, fallen more rapidly than per capita income, suggesting 
that a heavy burden of the recent economic crisis has been borne by wage and 
salary earners. As a consequence, the public sector and civil service employees, 
having failed to obtain a living wage from formal employment, have also resorted 
to alternative informal means of economic survival. 
In rural areas, a parallel of the informalization process in the urban areas has 
taken place with a deterioration in rural incomes. As the economic crisis deepened, 
the non-availability of basic incentive goods in rural areas was aggravated by 
official rationing (Bevan et al., 1989). Concurrently, appreciation in the real 
exchange rate reduced the real prices of cash crops. Agriculture was stagnating in 
the face of weaknesses in the transport and marketing systems and the subsequent 
rising marketing margins of the official systems that resulted in large transfers 
from peasants to the state (Ellis, 1982). As a consequence, average rural incomes 
per household are estimated to have fallen by 47.9% over the period 1977-83. 
Real rural wage rates also declined substantially over the period. The average 
off-farm wage in 1980 was about Tsh36 per day compared to Tsh42 per day in 
1983 - a fall in real terms of 29% (Collier et al., 1986). The high rate of inflation 
(averaging 30% annually) and the high rate of implicit taxation on the export 
crops (through currency over-evaluation) destroyed the parity between export 
crops and food crops inducing farmers to switch from cash to food crops which 
could also be easily traded in the parallel market. As real farm incomes declined 
consistently, farmers began to derive an increasing part of their cash incomes 
from non-farm sources, including migrant remittances giving rise to a thriving 
rural informal sector (Jamal and Weeks, 1988). 
The second source of informal sector growth in Tanzania has been the stagnation 
in formal wage employment. Modern sector employment accounted for a relatively 
insignificant small share of only 6.9% of the total active labour force in 1978. 
This share is estimated to have grown only marginally to about 7.1% in 1988. At 
the same time, the total labour force is estimated at 10 million at the end of 1988, 
increasing at nearly 3% percent per annum. This implies 300,000 new entrants 
into the labour market. However, actual formal employment has absorbed less 
than 15,000 per annum since the mid-1980s. In fact, total wage employment, 
which nearly doubled in absolute terms between 1975 and 1984, declined from a 
peak of 732,209 in 1984 to 711,800 in 1989. Even in the parastatal sector, the 
largest employer in the formal sector, employment more than doubled between 
1976 and 1985 and then declined from a peak of 191,751 to 182,620 in 1989. 
Quite clearly, the growth of the labour force has outpaced by far the growth of the 
formal economy, confirming the gravity of the employment problem confronting 
the country. 
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There are indications that the rapidly growing labour force and declining wage 
employment has caused rising unemployment in Tanzania (ILO, 1991). In urban 
areas, levels of unemployment have been exacerbated by the rural to urban 
migration of the past three to four decades4; and the failure by most of the urban-
based modern activities to absorb a significant portion of the growing labour 
force because of their greater capital and import intensive technologies. 
The rapid growth in informal sector employment in recent years has been 
made possible by a number of developments. On the labour demand side, the 
government has reduced its previously prohibitive stance towards the informal 
sector. On the labour supply side, the sector has drawn its workers from a growing 
pool of unemployed resulting from the 1985 retrenchment of 27,291 civil service 
workers, a government freeze on employment growth following the adoption of 
the economic recovery programme and increased female participation caused by 
the hardships of the economic crisis (ILO, 1991). 
The combined effects of falling real wages, stagnating employment levels, 
poor prospects for growth of formal wage employment, retrenchment of civil 
service employees and the rapidly growing labour force have increased dependence 
on the informal sector as a source of employment, income and survival. 
Consequently, in Tanzania, the growth of informal sector activities should be 
seen as representing mainly legitimate survival strategies adopted in the face of 
declining incomes and growing unemployment. They aim to raise income for 
subsistence or to generate additional surplus for future capital accumulation. The 
sector can thus be viewed as a creative response to the state incapacity to satisfy 
the basic needs of the majority poor. 
Developments in parallel markets 
The Arusha Declaration of February 1967 committed the Tanzanian government 
to future policies revolving around four themes: socialism, rural development, 
self reliance and economic growth. In pursuit of these goals there was a series of 
nationalizations not only of the strategic activities of the economy in the 
manufacturing industry, finance, commerce, mining construction, export-import 
trade and crop marketing but also, paradoxically, the less important retail trading 
activities such as privately-owned butcheries, rural shops, rented buildings and 
estate farms. Even in rural areas, a villagization (Ujamaa Villages) programme 
was put in place to collectivize peasant agriculture. Thereafter, government 
intervention increasingly assumed the form of promoting new public institutions 
and the active use of a wide range of economic policy instruments5. 
The overall result has been the dramatic expansion of the public sector beyond 
its technical and managerial capacities - an expansion which has invariably been 
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associated with proliferation of unproductive bureaucracies and financial loss. 
The number of public organizations (parastatals) increased from about 43 in 1966to 
380 by 1979 and about 425 by mid-1980s. In relative terms, only in countries as 
large as Brazil (six times the population and 50 times the GDP of Tanzania) and 
Mexico (3.6 times the population and 35 times the GDP) can one find such a 
large number of parastatals (World Bank, 1988). 
It is widely believed and extensively documented that the excessive government 
intervention and inappropriate macro-policies led to an acute shortage of goods 
and services and an associated rapid increase in prices, in both the controlled and 
uncontrolled markets6. The situation worsened during the post-1979 foreign 
exchange crisis and lead to the development of parallel markets as producers and 
consumers went underground and sought to evade expensive, excessively complex 
and time consuming official controls. 
Available evidence, though patchy, suggests that up to the mid-1970s parallel 
market activities were not significant in Tanzania (Odegaard, 1985). However, 
pervasive price controls, the confinement of goods to inefficient parastatal 
monopolies, strict foreign exchange regulations and import licensing have 
exacerbated the development of parallel market activities, especially up to the 
mid-1980s. Odegaard (1985) suggests that between 1978 and 1982 about 70% of 
marketed maize was sold in the parallel market annually, contrary to government 
regulation. Estimates by the Marketing Development Bureau (MDB) lend support 
to these estimates by revealing that between 1971 and 1987 about two-thirds of 
marketed maize, and over four-fifths of marketed rice were sold through the 
unofficial markets. Other surveys by Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) and 
Bevan et al. (1989) confirm these findings. 
Likewise, there is evidence that foreign exchange rationing and overvaluation 
of the shilling have stimulated parallel markets for hard currencies. Table 2 shows 
developments in the official, parallel and computed real exchange rates. It is quite 
evident that the extent of apparent overvaluation, that is, the percentage which 
the official parity value of the shilling exceeds its parallel rate value, was at levels 
above 200% for the period 1981-86, peaking at 477% in 1985. The extent of 
overvaluation appears to have been reduced significantly after 1986 through a 
series of currency devaluations. A similar picture emerges from the computed 
real exchange rate which shows a significant appreciation of the shilling between 
1977 and 1985, the year just before the adoption of the economic recovery 
programme (ERP). 
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Table 2 Tanzania: official, parallel and real exchange rates, 1970-91 (TSh per US $1) 
Year Official Unofficial Apparent Real Nominal 
rate rate over- exchange equivalent 
period period valuation rate1 exchange 
average average % rate2 
(D (2) (3)=(2/1)(100)-1 (4) (5) 
1970 7.14 10.10 41.5 9.30 6.37 
1971 7.14 11.60 62.5 9.32 6.35 
1972 7.14 15.20 112.9 9.06 6.54 
1973 7.02 14.53 107.0 8.67 6.71 
1974 7.14 13.46 88.5 8.36 7.08 
1975 7.37 20.58 179.2 7.53 8.11 
1976 8.38 21.93 161.7 8.65 8.02 
1977 8.29 21.47 159.0 8.29 8.29 
1978 7.71 13.07 69.5 7.43 8.60 
1979 8.22 11.98 45.7 7.59 8.97 
1980 8.20 21.02 156.3 6.49 10.48 
1981 8.28 26.57 220.8 5.74 11.96 
1982 9.28 32.60 251.6 5.37 14.33 
1983 11.14 39.62 255.7 5.34 17.29 
1984 15.29 57.08 273.3 5.67 22.35 
1985 17.47 100.80 477.0 5.03 28.81 
1986 32.70 165.00 404.6 7.27 37.29 
1987 64.26 180.00 180.1 11.32 47.07 
1988 99.29 210.00 111.5 13.76 59.83 
1989 143.38 250.00 74.4 16.47 72.17 
1990 195.07 300.00 53.8 19.61 82.46 
1991 225.00 365.00 62.2 n.a n.a 
Notes: 
1 Real exchange rate [RER) is computed as: 
™ ( m ) " m) 
where 
NOER is the nominal official exchange rate of the Tsh to the US dollar 
CPHC is the consumer price index for industrialized countries; and 
CPITZ is the consumer price index for Tanzania 
2 Nominal equivalent exchange rate (NEER) i.e., the rate that would have maintained a constant real exchange rate at 
the 1977 level is defined as: 
NEER = NOER-j-J {^P\NEER = NOER J 77 V CPIIC J " \CPHCJ 
where 
NOER,-, is Tanzania's nominal official exchange rate in 1977; and CPITZand CPHCxe as defined above. 
Sourcv.Pick's Currency Yearbooks parallel rates up to 1986; Maliyamkono and Bagachwa(1990) for parallel rates 
between 1987-89; Business Times (Tanzania) for parallel rates for 1990-91; and Bank of Tanzania for official rates. 
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Black market activities 
Hard data on the volume of black market activities in Tanzania is difficult to find. 
The study by Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) used the value of goods seized 
by customs officials to estimate the magnitude of illegal imports and exports. 
Goods seized by customs are normally those which have been illegally imported 
or exported or have otherwise contravened the Customs Management Act by 
misreporting of value, weight, volume, quantity or description. According to the 
estimates, illegal exports and imports as proportions of official exports and imports 
were estimated to be 3.6 and 10% respectively in 1985. 
However, these figures grossly understate the real magnitude of illegal exports 
and imports. For example, in another study, it was estimated that in 1989, two-
thirds of gold and gemstone production was sold in the black market (Bagachwa 
et al, 1989). The same study revealed that the illegal sale of wildlife trophies 
earned US$148 million in foreign exchange, contrasted to the official foreign 
exchange earnings of about US$2.8 million. About 90% of marketed cardamom 
and 12% of marketed coffee is smuggled out of the country annually. Parallel 
revenue from tourism was estimated at US$69.3 million, three times the value of 
official foreign exchange earnings from the entire sector. Unregistered housing 
services provided by individuals to expatriates denied government of an estimated 
US$33 million in 1988 alone. 
Another glimpse at the magnitude of parallel exports can be obtained by 
examining the volume of own-funded imports. Imports under this category are 
funded with the importer's own foreign exchange. When the scheme started in 
1984 it was thought that the accumulated foreign exchange by residents (obtained 
mainly through parallel markets) would be exhausted within a year. This has not 
been the case. Import licenses issued under own funds doubled within a span of 
four years from US$252 million (19% of total import licenses) in 1984 to US$638 
million (35.1% of total import licenses) in 1988. Although figures for 1991 show 
that this declined to US$494 million (i.e., 29% of total import licenses), this value 
is still significant. According to Mbelle et al (1991), about 90% of own-funded 
imports are financed by unofficial foreign exchange earnings from illegal exports. 
Over- and under-invoicing of imports and exports are other manifestations of 
black market transactions. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) found that in 
1985 about 18,7% (about US$177 million) of total official imports were under-
invoiced and that in 1986, Tanzania's exports were under-invoiced by 17% (i.e., 
about US$49 million). Yeats (1990) said the volume of unrecorded (smuggled 
and under-invoiced) exports from Tanzania could be immense and revealed that 
while reported exports to other Sub-Saharan African countries in 1983 of US$19 
million, those same countries reported imports from Tanzania of US$70 million. 
IV Est imating the size of the second e c o n o m y 
Estimation method and model specification 
The methodology for estimating the second economy has been a growing subject 
of debate7. In Tanzania, the nature and dynamics of the second economy have 
been analyzed extensively by Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990). However, 
despite this pioneering work, new estimates are required for two reasons. 
First, the Maliyamkono-Bagachwa estimates were made for the 1975-86 pe-
riod. There is a need, therefore, to update the estimates to cover the 1986-90 
period. Since the 1986-90 period has been associated with the initial stages of the 
implementation of the market-oriented Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) 
reforms, it will be instructive in gauging the impact of liberalization policies on 
the development of the second economy. Second, the Maliyamkono-Bagachwa 
study estimated the size of the second economy using the currency-demand de-
posit (C-DD) ratio as suggested by Gutmann8. However, problems associated 
with this method are enormous, as readily acknowledged by the authors9. 
To improve the validity of the estimates, a more flexible and elaborate econo-
metric method based on a demand for currency equation and its modified ver-
sions will be used (Tanzi, 1982; 1983; Isachsen etal., 1982; May, 1985). A useful 
feature of this is its recognition of other explanatory factors other than changes in 
second economic transactions which can explain the behaviour of currency hoard-
ing. Although the approach still assumes that the second economy transactions 
are primarily undertaken in the form of cash payments that avoid detection, it is 
s o m e w h a t f l ex ib l e in that it does not a s sume cons t ancy in the 
C-DD ratio and in addition the results are not sensitive to the choice of the initial 
period. 
The approach is based on the demand for currency. Cagan (1958), following 
the arguments by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), was the first to use the trans-
actions demand for currency approach. He identified the following major deter-
minants for currency holdings: 
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1. The opportunity cost of holding currency; 
2. The expected real income per capita; 
3. The volume of retail trade; 
4. The volume of travel per capita; 
5. The degree of urbanization; and 
6. The level of income taxation. 
In addition, Isachsen et al. (1982) argued for the inclusion of the Mitchell-
Hawtrey effect in the analysis of the determinants of the transactions demand for 
currency. According to that effect, two factors influence the relative use of currency 
over the business cycle. In the first, relatively more currency is required per unit 
of transaction in retail transactions than in other types of transactions. Second, 
the increase in the share of wage incomes relative to total factor incomes should 
result in cash use increase, as usually wages are paid in cash rather than in cheques, 
which are more normally used in other forms of factor incomes. 
In a generalized form the demand for currency equation may be stated as: 
where DC is the demand for currency as measured by any of the cash-demand 
deposit ratio (C-DD), the cash-narrow money ratio (C-M,) the cash-broad 
money ratio (C-M2) or real currency holdings (RC). Xl,...,Xll are the logarithms 
of variables traditionally considered to be the major determinants in the demand 
for currency; the Xn+l,..., X, are the logarithms of the proxies for variables that 
stimulate second economy activity; U is the stochastic disturbance term. 
When the variables that stimulate second economy activity disappear, i.e., when 
X„+1 = ...X, = 0, then the regression equation yields the estimate of the demand 
for currency of the formal economy. It is then possible to estimate currency 
holdings with or without second economy activity. The difference gives an 
estimate of the currency held in the second economy which, when multiplied by 
the income velocity of money, gives an indication of the size of the second 
economy. 
The demand for currency equation for Tanzania was initially specified as: 
(1) InDC = f(Xl,X2,...,Xn;Xn+l,...,Xl) + lr\U 
( 2 ) 
In RC = a0 + al In YR + a2 In RIR + a3 In RPFC 
+a4 In NBC I + a5 In INFL + a6 ln(l + GVI) 
+a1 ln(l + ATR) + a8 In POER + In U. 
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where, 
RC = real currency holdings, i.e., nominal currency deflated by the 
National Consumer Price Index (NCPT)\ 
YR = real income, i.e., nominal income deflated by GDP deflator; 
RIR = real interest rate on savings deposits, equal to the difference 
between nominal interest rate on savings deposits and the rate of 
inflation; 
RPFC = the ratio of private final consumption expenditure to total expen 
diture on GDP; 
NBCI = the index of the number of National Bank of Commerce branches; 
INFL = the rate of inflation; 
GVI = the ratio of parastatal employees over total employees, a measure 
of government intervention; 
ATR = the average tax rate, equal to the ratio of the sum of income and 
corporate taxes to the sum of compensation of employees and 
operating surplus; 
POER = the ratio of parallel exchange rate to the official one; and 
U = the error term. 
As can be seen, Equation (2) includes as arguments the real income YR which 
is used as the transactions variable and is expected to bear a positive sign; and the 
opportunity cost variables of holding currency in lieu of holding alternative 
financial assets (e.g., savings deposits) and physical assets (e.g., commodities), 
i.e., RIR and INFL respectively. These are expected to change conversely to the 
level of currency holdings. The share of private final consumption expenditure in 
national income (RPFC) represents the Mitchell-Hawtrey effect and, when it 
increases, forces people to hoard more currency in order to meet relatively 
increased purchases of goods and services. 
Increases in the number of commercial banking branches ( N B C I ) facilitate 
widespread access to banking services and induce the public to put their savings 
into interest-earning financial assets or to open up bank accounts to avoid theft, 
fire, etc. The remaining variables, GVI, ATR, and POER, stand to capture the 
amount of currency necessary to run the underground activities. The first variable, 
GVI, is a proxy for government intervention and regulation in the production and 
distribution of goods and services. When the government tightens its controls 
over economic activities, excess demand or supply will develop which will drive 
operators into informal activities. 
The second variable, ATR, is proxy to measure how much currency is held as 
a result of income tax evasion. The last variable, POER, captures the contribution 
of the parallel market in raising public holding of currency due to overvaluation 
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of the domestic currency. The discrepancy between the official and the parallel 
exchange rates and control of the foreign exchange market stimulate not only the 
parallel market for hard currencies but also other forms of illegal transactions 
such as smuggling, under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports, 
etc. 
Empirical results 
Based on data from the period 1968 to 1990, Equation (2) was estimated by using 
the ordinary least squares method (OLS). Within the broad framework of the 
general functional form, alternative variables and proxies were used during trial 
estimations10. To solve the equation for a situation where second economy activities 
are assumed to be absent, relevant tax and government intervention variables are 
equated to zero and replaced by their values plus one. The best results were obtained 
for Equation (3): 
In RC = -16 .350 + 2.377 In YR - 0.828 In NBCI + 0.227 ln(l + GVI) + 
(-3.476X4.882) (-5.083) (1.7390) 
15.990 ln(l + ATR) 
(7.503) 
R2 = 0.90 DW - 1.44 F-statistic = 49.503 
Values in parentheses are the t-values. 
The estimated Equation (3) appears quite robust. The/?2 is impressively high 
(0.90) implying that most of the variation in RC is explained by the estimated 
equation. In all cases except one (1 + GVI), the t-values for the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The t-value for the coefficient (1 + GVI) 
is significant at the 10% level. All coefficients have correct signs. The absence of 
first order auto-correlation is indicated by the value of the DW statistic and was 
confirmed on the basis of the Lagrangean multiplier (LM) test11. A comparison of 
variances between the two periods and the results of the Ramsey RESET test 
suggested the. absence of heteroscedasticity12. The Chow F test confirmed the 
parameter stability when the estimation period was divided between the period 
before and after the adoption of the economic recovery programme in 198613. 
The overall results appear fairly reasonable and provide a firm basis for further 
analysis of the effect of the second economy on currency holdings. 
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Table 3 Estimates of the second economy in Tanzania, 1968-90 
1 7 
Second Economy 
Estimated GDP as % of 
official GDP 
Year Actual Legal Illegal Total Income Second Econo- Gutmann 
currency currency currency currency velocity economy metric 
(Tsh (Tsh (Tsh (SE) GDP (Tanzi) 
million) million) million) (Tsh million) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1968 528.6 289.7 208.3 498.3 6.78 1413.1 19.7 6.1 
1969 605.0 337.1 279.2 616.3 5.88 1641.3 22.0 1.7 
1970 818.4 426.9 378.6 805.6 6.38 2416.1 29.4 22.7 
1971 986.4 481.5 513.6 995.0 5.70 2928.1 33.1 20.8 
1972 1201.1 566.2 630.7 1197.1 5.93 3739.0 37.3 30.0 
1973 1198.6 546.2 662.8 1209.0 5.41 3588.2 31.2 10.7 
1974 1517.3 555.9 912.1 1468.1 5.62 5121.9 36.6 12.1 
1975 1755.8 716.3 1320.4 2036.7 5.24 6914.0 40.7 16.6 
1976 2071.3 877.6 1445.0 2322.7 5.23 7560.9 34.9 2.8 
1977 2379.1 935.8 1615.9 2551.7 5.20 8407.9 32.7 0.3 
1978 2915.2 974.6 1807.2 2781.8 5.85 10571.3 37.0 9.8 
1979 4055.4 1143.9 2398.8 3542.8 4.27 10239.8 31.9 2.9 
1980 5245.4 1570.5 3516.2 5086.7 3.87 13617.7 36.4 3.6 
1981 6616.0 1934.7 4263.4 6198.1 4.10 17461.7 39.8 10.3 
1982 7988.7 2491.6 5324.9 7816.5 4.10 21815.2 41.5 11.5 
1983 8194.2 2924.7 5619.4 8544.0 4.09 23002.4 36.7 4.6 
1984 10472.4 3856.6 6466.7 10323.4 5.61 36298.8 46.5 28.3 
1985 12719.0 5263.9 8016.7 13280.6 6.07 48636.8 45.0 26.6 
1986 18309.7 7088.1 10110.2 17198.2 5.73 57921.9 41.1 28.7 
1987 24550.8 9699.2 13283.0 22982.2 6.21 82456.2 41.2 31.3 
1988 31702.3 13337.8 19527.8 32865.6 6.06 118384.4 41.5 22.1 
1989 41094.8 17051.6 28520.6 45572.2 5.75 163918.2 48.9 25.4 
1990 57919.1 21169.1 34524.5 55693.6 5.39 186112.2 46.4 31.4 
Sources: Bank of Tanzania; Tanzanian Economic Trends, Vol. 5 Nos. 1 and 2 (1992); National Accounts of 
Tanzania (various issues); and Tanzania Economic Survey (various years). 
Size of the second economy 
The resulting yearly estimates of the second economy GDP14 are shown in Table 
3. The estimates show a relatively large size for the second economy which rose 
from modest values of between 20-22% of official nominal GDP in the late 1960s, 
through 30-39% during the 1970s and early 1980s to reach over 40% between 
1984 and 1990. The corresponding shares for 1989 and 1990 were 49% and 46% 
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respectively. The Tanzi method estimates of the second economy (see Table 3, 
column 7) are consistently higher than those arrived at using the Gutmann method 
(column 8). 
Table 4 presents the growth of the official, second and total economy GDP in 
real terms and corresponding yearly changes. A very different picture of total 
(official plus second economy) GDP emerges from the table. The years of serious 
Table 4 Real growth in official and second economies of Tanzania, 1968-90 
Second economy 
Tsh million as percentage of Percentage yearly change 
Year Official Second Total Official Total Official Second Total 
real ec. real real real real real ec. real real 
GDP1 GDP1 GDP GDP GDP GDP % GDP % GDP % 
(D (2) (3) = (1+2 ) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1968 14479.8 2849.0 17328.8 19.7 16.4 5.2 . . 
1969 14746.0 3244.2 17990.2 22.0 18.0 1.8 13.9 3.8 
1970 15600.1 4588.2 20188.3 29.4 22.7 5.8 41.4 12.2 
1971 16254.4 5373.7 21628.1 33.1 24.8 4.2 17.1 7.1 
1972 17347.4 6465.5 23812.9 37.3 27.2 6.7 20.3 10.1 
1973 17874.9 5582.1 23457.0 31.2 23.8 3.0 -13.7 -5.1 
1974 18323.3 6698.9 25022.2 36.6 26.8 2.5 20.0 6.7 
1975 19406.0 7898.1 27304.1 40.7 28.9 5.9 17.9 9.1 
1976 21652.0 7560.9 29212.9 34.9 25.9 11.6 -4.3 7.0 
1977 21739.3 7112.7 28852.0 32.7 24.7 0.4 -5.9 -1.2 
1978 22001.4 8137.4 30138.8 37.0 27.0 1.2 14.4 4.5 
1979 22755.4 7255.1 30010.5 31.9 24.2 3.4 -10.8 -0.4 
1980 23419.0 8514.8 31933.8 36.4 26.7 2.9 17.4 6.4 
1981 23301.0 9267.0 32568.0 39.8 28.5 -0.5 8.8 2.0 
1982 23439.2 9731.1 33170.3 41.8 29.3 0.6 5.0 1.0 
1983 22886.4 8408.5 31294.9 36.7 26.9 -2.3 -13.6 -5.7 
1984 23656.0 10988.7 34644.7 46.5 31.7 3.4 30.7 10.7 
1985 24278.0 10925.0 35203.0 45.0 31.0 2.6 -0.6 1.6 
1986 25070.0 10308.4 35378.4 41.1 29.1 3.2 -5.6 0.5 
1987 26344.9 10841.1 37186.0 41.2 29.2 5.1 5.2 5.1 
1988 27459.9 11400.3 38860.2 41.5 29.3 4.2 5.2 4.5 
1989 28378.0 13864.7 42242.7 48.9 32.8 3.3 21.6 8.7 
1990 29368.1 13639.9 43008.0 46.4 31.7 3.5 -1.6 1.8 
Note:1 Nominal figures deflated by the implicit official GDP deflator. 
Sources: Table 3; Tanzanian Economic Trends, Vol. 5 Nos. 1 and 2 (1992). NationalAccounts of Tanzania (various 
issues). 
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economic decline in the official economy were from 1980 to 1.983, while for the 
total economy they were 1973,1977,1978 and 1983. In the two economies, growth 
appears to have recovered consistently between 1987 and 1989. 
However, there appears no clear relationship between the growth of the real 
official GDP and that of the real second economy GDP. In some years, for example, 
1972 and 1984, an upswing in the official economy seems to have stimulated the 
demand for second economy activities. In others, like 1974 and 1981, low growth 
in the official economy was associated with increased opportunity to work in the 
second economy. The computed correlation coefficient for the relation between 
the real official and second economy growth rates, though positive, is very low 
(0.22) and not statistically significant from zero, confirming the absence of a 
relation between the two. 
A striking feature in Table 4 is column (5), which indicates the share of the 
second economy in the total (official plus second) economy. Except for a few 
minor fluctuations, this share has stayed remarkably constant at around 25-30% 
throughout the last two decades. This is so even after the introduction of 
liberalization measures in 1986. 
The persistence of a rather stable share of the second economy in the total 
economy despite the ups and downs in the official economy, could be attributed 
to the fact that increases in real incomes tend to push people into higher marginal 
income tax brackets generally, and especially for the period 1968 to 1985. It 
could also be attributed to the fact that regulations and controls were not relaxed, 
even during boom periods. Furthermore, because production and distribution of 
basic goods and services were confined to public sector enterprises, increases in 
real incomes were being increasingly channelled into investments in the informal 
sector, which are difficult to tax and control. 
The continuing growth of the second economy during the economic recovery 
programme (1986-90) period is mainly attributed to the dramatic increase of 
informal sector activities, as explained in Section III. This seems so particularly 
as some of the liberalization policy measures introduced recently by the 
government have become official and hence reduced some of the presumably 
parallel and black market activities15. While certain types of parallel and black 
market activities seem to have declined, others have not. In particular, there appears 
to be a significant volume of illegal exports to sustain the flow of own funds 
imports16. 
V Conc lus ion 
The second economy in Tanzania seem to have grown from a low level of 
20% of official GDP during the late 1960s to a sizeable proportion of more than 
40% after the mid-1980s. Before 1986, measures taken to restrict the expansion 
of second economy activities took the form of strict enforcement of government 
controls rather than freeing up operations in the state controlled economy. Over 
time the second economy has become a major source of livelihood, employment, 
and incomes for the majority of the households. Since the mid-1980s, government 
has relaxed various controls and allowed an extended range of consumer goods 
to enter more freely into the domestic market. The severe shortages common in 
the past have disappeared. Although the rapid growth of the parallel market and, 
to some extent, black market components of the second economy characteristic 
of the mid-1980s has subsequently been halted, the informal sector component 
continues nevertheless to constitute an important part of the economy as real 
wages continue to decline and prospects for formal employment dwindle. 
The existence of such a sizeable sector of unrecorded domestic and international 
economic transactions has several implications relevant for policy. First, it suggests 
that the existing national accounts series are not robust enough for meaningful 
economic analysis, and for policy and programme formulation. This casts doubt 
on the reliability of macroeconomic aggregates on which existing policies have 
been made. Considerable efforts have to be made by the national accounts section 
in the Bureau of Statistics to establish systematic estimates of the major 
components of the second economy with a view of incorporating these into the 
official national accounts series. 
Second, the results suggest that the real total economy is more healthy than 
the gloomy picture painted by official statistics. This puts into question any policy 
stance with exclusive emphasis on raising domestic production and promoting 
exports. There is indeed a justifiable need to pay extra attention to the mobilization 
and use of existing idle and second economy resources. Some of the policy 
measures under the ERP, such as price decontrol, deconfinement, own funds 
imports, introduction of exchange bureaux, etc., which attempt to stimulate the 
f low of resources through the official economy, ought to be effect ively 
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implemented. 
Finally, the coexistence of informal, parallel and black market activities in the 
second economy casts doubt on a blanket policy for the economy. Whereas it is 
desirable to reduce the extent of parallel and black market activities by reducing 
the extent of government controls and restrictions, it is equally desirable to promote 
informal sector activities through selective intervention mechanisms aimed at 
easing capital, technology and market constraints facing the sector. There is also 
a need to design an explicit policy for the informal sector. This will help to offset 
the misconceived and negative attitudes of some government officials and potential 
investors. It will also provide a more secure and predictable investment climate 
for the sector. 
Notes 
1 The diversity of terminology and various concepts used to describe the 
second economy is reviewed by Tanzi (1982; 1983), Schneider (1986), Wiles 
(1987), and Bhattacharyya (1990). Roemer and Jones (1991) make a useful 
distinction between parallel, fragmented and black markets. 
2 Our definition of the 'second economy' is very close to that of the 'under-
ground' economy used by Tanzi (1982) and similar to Schneider's (1986) 
'hidden' economy. 
3 See, for example, ILO (1991) and Vandemoortele (1991) for recent trends 
in Africa's informal sector. 
4 Between 1978 and 1988, annual rates of urban and rural population growth 
a v e r a g e d 4.9 and 2.5% respectively (World Bank, 1991). 
5 The control mechanisms included: central control of investment planning 
with restrictive codes on private and foreign investment; administrative 
allocation of foreign exchange through import licensing; price controls; 
regulation of interest rates and credit rationing; wage regulation; and 
confinement of wholesale and retail trade for basic imported and domestic 
commodities to specified parastatal organizations. 
6 See for instance, studies by Odegaard (1985); Lundahl and Ndulu (1987); 
Bev'an et al. (1989; 1990); and Bagachwa (1991; 1992). 
7 For a discussion and application of the various methods see Tanzi (1982), 
S c h n e i d e r (1986), Bhattacharyya (1990) and Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 
(1990). 
8. 
The methodology used by R Gutmann (1977) in computing the size of the 
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second economy (SE) can be reduced to the following formula: 
SE = 
OGDP 
* [M, -(DD* BR)] 
DD* BR 
where 
OGDP official GDP; 
narrow money supply; 
demand deposits; 
1 plus the benchmark cash-demand deposit ratio, and 




9. The assumed constancy of the C-DD ratio over time, the assumptions that 
all transactions involving second economy exchanges are paid in cash only, 
and the absence of second economy activities during the benchmark period 
are, given the Tanzanian context, highly questionable. 
10. Five main equations were estimated using, respectively, the currency-
demand deposit ratio (C-DD), the currency-money (C-Mt and C-M2) ratios 
and real currency holdings (RC) as dependent variables. The results of the 
best five equations are summarized in Appendix A. In general, estimates 
using ratios i.e., C-DD, C-M^ and C-M;, exhibited relatively lower R2 than 
those based on . Additionally, in the former estimates, two of the variables 
that stimulate informality, GVI and ATR, were consistently insignificant. 
Subsequent estimation has thus been based on RC. In the latter case, three 
variables i.e., RPFC, INFL and POER, have been dropped from the final 
estimating equation because they had either wrong signs and/or were 
statistically insignificant. 
11. For the LM test, the calculated values of x2 and F( 1,17) were equal to 1.7267 
and 1.3798 respectively. 
12. A comparison of variances for the 1968-79 and 1980-90 periods gave a 
calculated value of F(7,6) equal to 2.13 while Ramsey's RESET test gave a 
value of 0.0138. 
13. The second Chow test gave an F(23, 13) equal to 0.30. 
1 4 . The technique used is that developed by Tanzi (1983). First we estimate 
total real currency (TRQ as predicted by Equation (3). Then predicted real 
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legal currency ( R L Q is estimated by dropping the variables (GVI and ATR) 
that stimulate informality. The difference (i.e. RIRC = TRC-RLQ is the 
real illegal currency. This is then multiplied by the observed transaction 
velocity of money V, (V = GDP/ A/,) to obtain an estimate for second 
economy GDP. 
15. For example, regular adjustment in the foreign exchange rate and further 
liberalization of the Open General Licence (OGL) foreign exchange funds 
have resulted in a significant decline in the extent of overvaluation of the 
shilling and a corresponding fall in the parallel market premium for dollars 
(Table 2). The ratio of parallel to official maize prices fell from 2.1 in 1984 
to 1.0 in 1988 following the introduction of grain marketing liberalization. 
Furthermore, beginning in the mid-1980s, trade liberalization removed some 
of the items like televisions and video recorders from the illegal imports 
list. Private traders have been allowed to participate in the purchase and 
distribution of grains and in the export of the previously confined traditional 
and non-traditional exports. The Central Bank of Tanzania has been allowed 
to purchase domestic gold (previously traded exclusively in the parallel 
market) at parallel market prices and as a result, official gold exports rose 
from 28kg in 1989 to 5,100kg in 1991. Lastly, foreign exchange bureaux 
licensed to trade currencies at market determined exchange rates began 
operations in April 1992. 
16. Although the share of own funds imports in total import funds has declined 
f rom an annual average of 38.2% (1985-88) to 26.6% (1989-91), it 
nevertheless remains significant, suggesting continued smuggling. 
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